A comparison of the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq by Walker, James A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-09
A comparison of the Democratic Security Policy in
Colombia and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq
Walker, James A.












A COMPARISON OF THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 
POLICY IN COLOMBIA AND PROVINCIAL 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Douglas Porch 
  Sophal Ear 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Comparison of the Democratic Security Policy in 
Colombia and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 
6. AUTHOR(S)  James A. Walker 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The issue of security and democratic development in Colombia and Iraq are important for them as nations as 
well as for the international community. 
For Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy is a mechanism to establish government presence throughout 
the country, reclaim territory and the population from insurgent, paramilitary, and other criminal groups, and so end 
practically 60 years of internal conflict. Colombia’s chronic instability not only creates tensions in the country, but 
also in the region as well as the United States. The DSP is the latest in a long line of efforts to secure the country and 
its citizens from the grasp of Colombia’s insurgent and criminal groups. 
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, imported into Iraq from Afghanistan, have adapted to a different 
SSTR environment with difficulty. The lack of coordination and resources, as well as security threats, has severely 
limited their effectiveness. 
This thesis seeks to examine the strengths and weaknesses of both the DSP in Colombia and the PRTs in Iraq 
to determine their effectiveness, as well as which methods, strategies, and practices might be transferable to other 
SSTR environments.  
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
75 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Democratic Security Policy, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Combined 
Action Program, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Program, Military Support Groups, 
Colombia, Iraq, FARC, AUC, ELN, Al Qaeda, SSTR, stability, reconstruction, insurgent, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A COMPARISON OF THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY  
IN COLOMBIA AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ 
 
James A. Walker 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of Mississippi, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold Trinkunas, PhD 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The issue of security and democratic development in Colombia and Iraq are 
important for them as nations as well as for the international community. 
For Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy is a mechanism to establish 
government presence throughout the country; reclaim territory and the population from 
insurgent, paramilitary, and other criminal groups; and so end practically 60 years of 
internal conflict. Colombia’s chronic instability not only creates tensions in the country, 
but also in the region as well as the United States. The DSP is the latest in a long line of 
efforts to secure the country and its citizens from the grasp of Colombia’s insurgent and 
criminal groups. 
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, imported into Iraq from Afghanistan, have 
adapted to a different Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction environment 
with difficulty. The lack of coordination and resources, as well as security threats, has 
severely limited their effectiveness. 
This thesis seeks to examine the strengths and weaknesses of both the DSP in 
Colombia and the PRTs in Iraq to determine their effectiveness, as well as which 
methods, strategies, and practices might be transferable to other SSTR environments.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RELEVANCE  
 The issue of security and democratic development in Colombia and Iraq are 
important for them as nations as well as for the international community.  
For Colombia, the Democratic Security Policy (DSP) is a mechanism to establish 
government presence throughout the country; reclaim territory and the population from 
insurgent, paramilitary, and other criminal groups; and so end practically 60 years of 
internal conflict. Colombia’s chronic instability not only creates tension in the region, but 
also, because it is fed by crime, especially the drug trade, directly impacts the United 
States.  
For its part, the success of the coalition effort in Iraq will secure a country in 
which the United States and its allies have invested significant blood, treasure, and 
political capital. The creation of a stable, friendly Iraq will help secure U.S. interests in 
an oil-rich region vital to the security of the world, and serve to counter balance radical 
tendencies in other countries by supplying the example of a stable, prosperous 
democracy.  
B. THESIS 
 This thesis will examine, through a historical analysis, the effectiveness of and 
difference between the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia and Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq. This will be done in an effort to determine which 
one is more effective within its environment and what qualities make it so. The Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOE) will be applied to a number of categories. This exercise should 
indicate the best qualities of each approach and how they might be incorporated into the 
other’s practices.  
 The numbers of assassinations, murders, and kidnappings in Colombia have 
decreased since the introduction of the DSP in 2002. However, some critics argue that the 
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stability that has undeniably been brought to war-torn Colombia has been purchased at 
the cost of significant human rights violations.1  
 The policy has made a concerted effort to reach out to the people of Colombia and 
to the insurgent and paramilitary groups that have ruled much of the countryside since the 
1960s. Demobilization, security, bolstering the judicial system, and re-establishing 
governmental control of roads and rural areas are the hallmarks of this policy. The 
effectiveness of some of these efforts is debatable, but the government of Colombia has 
successfully contributed to a stabilized Colombia in a short seven-year period, while 
dealing with significant internal problems.  
 The main mission of the PRT is “to promote progress in governance, security, and 
reconstruction.”2 There are several factors that separate the PRTs from the DSP. First, 
PRTs are an external entity manned largely by foreign personnel that are being utilized to 
conduct stability and reconstruction operations (SSTR) in Iraq. In Colombia, the DSP is 
an indigenous entity being used to conduct SSTR operations. Even though PRTs are part 
of a foreign effort to stabilize Iraq, they have enjoyed a favorable reception from the 
population. Additionally, PRTs do not provide their own security and therefore must rely 
heavily on military forces for protection, which occasionally impedes progress. To assist 
in SSTR operations in areas where security is a concern, the Army has developed the 
ePRT, an element attached to a combat brigade, which allows the PRT to function in an 
insecure environment.3 
C. OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I will be a brief overview of the 
DSP and PRTs and why the study of this topic is important. Chapter II will provide a 
historical background of the United States’ and Colombia’s interaction and cooperation 
in civil military action and their progression into what is called the Democratic Security 
 
1 Human Rights Watch, “Colombia: Uribe Must Respect Judicial Independence,” report (October 
2008), 1.  
2 Robert Perito, “Special Report 152: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” United States Institute 
of Peace (2005): 6.  
3 GAO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO-09-86R,” (Washington, 
D.C.: 2008), 2.  
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Policy and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Chapter III will describe and analyze 
the Democratic Security Policy as well as the concerns of its critics. Chapter IV examines 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Iraq and provides an analysis of the 
methods used by PRTs in Iraq and how effective their actions have been in building and 
sustaining stability and establishing democratic institutions. The Conclusion will provide 
a comparison between the DSP and PRTs and establish which one has been more 
effective in adapting to its post-conflict environment.  And what “best practices” might 
be transported to other post-conflict situations.  
 4
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II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL MILITARY ACTION AND 
COOPERATION BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
 The United States and Colombia have long shared a friendly political relationship, 
which has translated into close economic and military ties. This chapter will trace the 
common origins of Colombia’s DSP and the United States’ PRTs and show how each 
evolved in order to meet their modern-day challenges.  
A.  EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY 
The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP), in the wake of the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959, was focused away from Europe toward areas considered vulnerable 
to communist subversion. This program played midwife to acción civica, which has 
dominated the Colombian military’s approach to counter-insurgency since the 1960s.4 
Acción civica was a counter-insurgency program that modernized and professionalized 
Colombia’s military following the civil war known as La Violencia, a decade-long 
conflict between Liberal and Conservative partisans. Founded in 1907, Colombia’s 
professional Army initially reflected the German influence projected through the Chilean 
military mission. However, this changed in 1942, when Colombia declared war on the 
Axis. Though Colombia sent no troops to Europe, as did Brazil, it cooperated closely 
with Washington in the defense of the Panama Canal and the campaign against U-boats 
in the Caribbean. Colombia also contributed a battalion and a ship to the Korean War 
(1951-1953). Army officers returning from that war standardized a U.S. staff structure 
and TO&E in the Colombian army, and opened the Escuela militar des Lanceros, based 
on the U.S. Army Ranger School. In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced 
the Alliance for Progress, a ten-year plan to aid the economic development of Latin 
America. The Alliance for Progress was a program developed to build and strengthen 
economic ties between the United States and South America. 
 
4 Robert M. Stein, Mark Ishimatsu and Richard J. Stoll, “The Fiscal Impact of the U.S. Military 
Assistance Program, 1967-1976,” The Western Political Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1985): 29. 
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General Álavro Valencia Tovar insists that the transfer of ideas was not a one-
way street. In 1959, an assessment team from the United States Department of State and 
the CIA visited Colombia to help fashion a military response to the lingering effects of 
La Violencia.  “I was battalion commander in Caldas where Liberal municipalities in 
west were at war with Conservatives,”5 he remembered. “This is where I invented civic 
action. I worked with the priests, who were mostly conservatives, but understood the 
need for reconciliation. A major from the U.S. military mission came by in 1959 (and this 
brought the ideas to the States). There were no books on this, so I had to use my 
imagination. We had no experience.” One outcome of the U.S. missions was Plan Lazo, a 
June 1962 Embassy-generated plan that was meant to unite the fragmented planning, 
coordination and intelligence efforts of the Colombian army, and to combine political, 
economic and social aspects into a unified counter-insurgency strategy.6 “Plan Lazo was 
devised to force government agencies to participate in civic action to attract the peasants 
and gather intelligence,” General Valencia insisted. “The requirement for combat 
intelligence was a lesson from Korea.”7 
Subsequent advisory teams imported notions of civic and psychological action 
that had become fashionable under President John F. Kennedy, for whom the Special 
Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is named.8  
These ideas found fertile soil for at least three reasons: First, the notion that the 
Colombian military should play a role in the economic and social development of the 
country dated at least from the 1930s. “The reigning impression in officialdom,” wrote 
future army commander Álvaro Valencia of this period, “was that the army was a 
superfluous institution in a country whose borders were settled. The military understood 
 
5 Douglas Porch, interview with General Álavro Valencia Tovar, Bogotá, 11 March 2008. I thank 
Professor Porch for permission to use this interview. 
6 Charles H. Briscoe, “Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special 
Operations History, PB 31-05-2 vol. 2, no. 4, (2006): 38-46 
7 Porch, interview with General Valencia.  
8 Kenneth Finlayson, “Colombia: A Special Relationship,” Veritas. Journal of Army Special 
Operations History, PB 31-05-2 vol. 2, no. 4 (2006): 5-7. 
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that it had to leave its barracks to undertake national projects that justified its costs.”9 So, 
the army needed a mission, which was virtually foisted upon it in 1958, when Liberal 
Party President Alberto Lleras, to pre-empt coups by conservative malcontents, told 
officers of the Bogotá garrison gathered in the Teatro Patria that politicians would 
concede the quasi-autonomy of the military so long as they abstained from politics.  In 
the long run, this separation of military and civilian functions proved baleful, because it 
became difficult to orchestrate a successful counter-insurgency strategy when the 
politicians saw security as an exclusively military problem.  
The DSP may be seen as the latest attempt to reverse what is called the “Lleras 
doctrine”—the autonomy of separate military and political realms. But in the short term, 
Lleras’ challenge was snapped up by officers, mainly Liberals who had been exiled to 
Korea to give Conservatives a free hand to deal with La Violencia. Their interaction with 
U.S. forces had showcased the abysmal professional standards of a Colombian army 
whose idea of counter-insurgency strategy was to displace or massacre populations 
thought sympathetic to the guerrilla. They saw counter-insurgency, carried out in a 
framework of gringo doctrines that the Colombians called variously acción civica, acción 
sociologica, or acción integral, as a way to modernize and professionalize the Colombian 
armed forces, and burnish a military image tarnished by the brutish excesses of La 
Violencia. They also saw acción civica as an internal “civilizing mission,” a way to use 
the military to moralize a country in which many of its citizens were brutalized by 
poverty, lacked hope, and hence had no stake in the future. “When I was commander of 
the fifth brigade, I paid lots of attention to civic action,” continued General Valencia. “I 
showed the mayor what we called the ‘seven black zones’ in Buccaramanga—seven 
zones of misery. I flew over Buccaramanga in a helicopter with him. We made a joint 
effort. He gave me land. We built a ‘transitional zone.’ The Peace Corps helped, and 
lived in the area. [The army] taught the people building techniques. We had to teach them 
to be owners, to be better people (emphasis added).”10 
 
9 Álvaro Valencia Tovar, Testimonio de una epoca. Años signados por el conflicto en el que han 
vivido inmersos el Estado y la sociedad colombian bajo el rotulo de la violencia. (Bogotá: Planeta, 1992), 
72.  
10 Porch, interview with General Valencia. 
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But these local successes were seldom repeated on a national scale, for several 
reasons. First, of course, was the “Lleras Doctrine,” which basically allowed politicians 
to wash their hands of impoverished, remote rural areas where there were few votes to be 
garnered in any case. A second problem was both a lack of resources in a developing 
country and interest groups resistant to change. Liberals generally argued that the lack of 
land was the fundamental cause of violence in Colombia. However, land reform ran up 
against the heated opposition of the large landowners who insisted that agriculture was 
profitable only with large exploitations. In 1958, the Instituto de Reforma Agraria - 
Incora  was created to redistribute land. Over time, it did have some success in marginal 
areas. But it failed to prove the dynamo of social change that its founders had hoped.11 In 
1985, President Belisario Betancur launched a Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación to 
provide resources to integrate demobilizing guerrillas. It failed in its primary mission for 
a variety of reasons, the principle one being underfunding.12 But those monies that were 
allocated set off squabbles among politicians that the party in power was directing 
development funds to its areas of influence to exercise political patronage.  
A third problem was that acción civica was not popular among politicians because 
they believed that it enticed the military into the civil realm, in contravention of the 
Lleras Doctrine, and politicized them. The first major advocate of acción civica in 
Colombia was chief of the army from 1961 and subsequently War Minister, General 
Alberto Ruiz Nova. Son of a prominent Liberal family who had commanded the 
Colombia Battalion in Korea, Ruiz transformed the armed forces into a civic action 
machine.13 Ruiz took his enthusiasm for acción integral beyond the limit of political 
prudence when, in 1964, he stood up in a public meeting and, in the presence of the 
President of the Republic, blasted politicians for not doing enough for the economic and 
 
11 Guillermo de la Peña, “Rural Mobilizations in Latin America since c 1920,” in Latin American 
Politics and Society, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 358-61. 
12 There was serious military opposition to demobilization. Also, the attack on the Palais de Justicia 
by the guerrilla group M-19 in 1985, in which all but one supreme court justice was killed, as well as 
numerous civilians and guerrillas, removed any incentive to lavish government largess on guerrillas. The 
PNR eventually evolved into a crop substitution program. Republica de Colombia. Departamento Nacional 
de Planeacion, Porgrama de Desarrollo Alternativo, Documento CONPES 2734-DNP-UDA-UJS, Bogotá, 
12 October 1994, http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/Legislacion_tematica/DR-
DesarrolloAlternativo%20Conpes_1994.pdf. 
13 See Memoria de Ministro de Guerra al Congreso, for 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966. 
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social development of Colombia and advocated land redistribution.14 President 
Guillermo León Valencia Muñóz probably suspected—correctly, no doubt—that Ruiz 
was promoting acción integral as a platform to mount a political campaign to succeed 
him, and ended his military career. A decade later, Valencia Tovar was fired as chief of 
the army after he locked horns with President Alfonso López Michelsen over a budget to 
coordinate army and civil ministry efforts to undertake more civic action projects.15 As a 
result of this refusal to combine civil and military efforts to nation build in Colombia, the 
efforts there were piecemeal, disjointed, underfunded and, ultimately, militarized. In the 
hands of the army, acción civica was transformed into an intelligence gathering 
enterprise, a way to inventory the population and monitor their resources to make sure 
that they were not going to the insurgency, finding interlocutors, and identifying 
guerrillas and their supporters.   
From the 1980s, Colombia’s security problems exploded as illegal drugs fueled 
the growth and violence of criminal cartels and insurgent groups, in particular, the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia, or FARC. Andrés Pastrana’s 1998 
election as president can be attributed to his promise to negotiate peace with the insurgent 
groups.16 Although peace negotiations with the FARC were ultimately unsuccessful, they 
bought time and created a favorable political climate to allow for President Pastrana to 
negotiate Plan Colombia.  Plan Colombia was a six-year, $7.5 billion, U.S.-funded, plan 
that would allow for the expansion and modernization of the Colombian armed forces 
and police. 
President Pastrana’s plan was to hold peace talks with the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). To demonstrate 
sincerity, Pastrana formed a demilitarized zone called the “despeje”, 
meaning “clear” or “open.” Here the FARC and the government of 
Colombia could have “breathing space.” Cessation of hostilities in the 
 
14 Valencia Tovar, Testimonio, 432-434. 
15 Porch, interview with General Valencia. 
16 Robert W. Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota: The Evolution of Colombia’s National 
Strategy,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History, PB 31-05-2, vol. 2, no. 4 (2006): 61. 
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despeje would ostensibly allow all sides to come to the negotiating table to 
discuss peace and ultimately bring an end to conflict in Colombia.17  
Even though President Pastrana hoped that these concessions towards the FARC would 
allow for the initiation of peace, the FARC used the despeje to “rest, refit, and build 
strength without the Colombian armed forces or police disrupting its activities.”18 In 
2001, Pastrana broke off negotiations with the FARC. The following year, Alvaro Uribe 
was elected president of Colombia.  
 Uribe inherited two advantages from his predecessor: a popular realization that 
the FARC was a criminal organization with no real interest in suspending its insurgency, 
and a U.S.-supported plan to increase and modernize the capabilities of the Colombian 
military and Colombian National Police. To combat the insurgents, Uribe established an 
offensive plan to increase security and eradicate the insurgent groups in Colombia, 
known as Plan Patriota.  
 Plan Patriota was a two-part campaign plan to protect the population, reclaim 
territory, and combat insurgents. The first phase would have the Colombian Forces attack 
certain FARC-controlled areas in an attempt to reclaim the territory. The second phase of 
Plan Patriota called for the CNP to immediately reoccupy the reclaimed territory and to 
provide law and order. This permitted the government to re-establish services to the area 
and allow the population to return.  
B.  EVOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
 Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction operations conducted by the 
United States in the past provide a wealth of historical knowledge upon which to base 
current operations. But following the loss of Vietnam, U.S. forces turned their backs on 
even the successful programs like Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS) program, in the belief that the U.S. public would not support a slow, 




17 Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,”61.  
18 Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 61.  
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“Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a conventional force capable of defeating a 
“peer competitor.” Meanwhile, Special Operations Forces lapsed into training for stealth 
raids.  
1.  Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program 
While the progression of Colombia’s DSP has a fairly linear trajectory, the PRTs 
have a more tortuous provenance. The very Military Assistance Program teams that 
converted Colombian forces (or who were converted by them if Valencia Tovar is to be 
believed) into fervent missionaries of “civic action,” became the progenitors in 1967 of 
the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, a 
combined civil-military advisory, pacification, and civil affairs effort in Vietnam. Many 
argue that Iraq’s PRTs are the direct descendants of CORDS. Others insist that there are 
significant differences.19  
“The CORDS organization paralleled the military and political structure of South 
Vietnamese Government, with a deputy for CORDS under each U.S. corps area 
commander and lower-ranking CORDS deputies at province and district headquarters,” 
writes Cosmos and Murray.20 The PRTs in Iraq lack such a well-defined command 
structure, which, some argue, has had a detrimental effect on the overall effectiveness of 
the program. In Vietnam, the CORDS in 1970 were under the direct control of the U.S. 
Ambassador in Saigon.21 This gave CORDS a direct link to the senior in country U.S.  
representative, which meant that all leaders of the pacification effort in Vietnam 
answered to one person. In Iraq, it is difficult to determine who is in charge and to whom 
one answers given the myriad of government and military structures. However, if the 
CORDS and PRTs have a different structure at the top, their work on the ground is 
similar. Like the PRTs, CORDS utilized the “military region and province councils, 
 
19 PHK, “Iraq is not Vietnam and PRTs are not CORDS,” Whirled View, 7 November, 2007, 
http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2007/11/iraq-is-not-vie.html.  
20Graham A. Cosmas and Lieutenant Colonel Terrence P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, ed. 
Major William R. Melton, USMC, and Jack Shulison (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 128. 
21 Ibid. 
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working closely with their counterpart CORDS organizations (that) over-saw 
implementation of the national plans at the lower levels of government.”22 
2. Combined Action Program 
The USMC Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam is another close 
relative of the PRTs. Created in 1965, the program increased in size through 1966, as 
Combined Action Companies (CACO) were created along with Combined Actions 
Groups (CAG). The CAP program was subordinate to the CACO and the CAG, which 
created a fairly linear command structure.  
In January 1970, the four CAGs consisted of a total of 42 Marine officers 
and 2,050 enlisted men, with two naval officers and 126 hospital 
corpsman. Organized  in 20 CACOs and 114 CAPs, these Americans 
worked with about 3,000 RF [Regional Force] and PF [Popular Force] 
soldiers. The 2d CAG in Quang Nam, largest of the four, consisted of 
eight CACOs with 36 CAPs and almost 700 Marine and Navy officers and 
men, while the smallest, the 4th in Quang Tri, had three CACOs and 18 
CAPs.23 
The CAP program was born in 1965, “when III MAF, in trying to secure the 
heavily populated area around Hue/Phu Bai, discovered a potential ally in the then 
disparaged and neglected popular forces.”24 The CAP program placed a “15-man Marine 
rifle squad paired with a 15- to 30-man PF platoon to defend one particular village.”25 
The platoons of Marines were placed in villages and hamlets throughout the country, to 
gain the trust of the local villagers and to protect them from Viet Cong (VC) Communist 
forces.  Hamlets are similar to villages but are smaller. The Marines living in the villages 
and hamlets, among the population, were able to build trust with villagers, which allowed 
the villagers to give information about members of the village sympathetic to or active in 
the VC. This trust combined with protection from the Marines forged a bond between the 
villagers and the Marines that staunched VC infiltration and influence in the small 
 
22 Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 129. 




                                                
hamlets. Unlike “search and destroy” missions that passed through areas like a storm 
before moving on, the CAP program left Marines in the villages even after firefights in 
order to provide a continued protection of the villagers from VC forces.  
This program was not without its drawbacks, however. The major concern with 
the CAP program was that Marines would be placed in villages and hamlets that had 
already been infiltrated by the VC. This made the Marines extremely vulnerable once 
they initially entered the hamlet or village area or until they were able to gain the trust of 
the villagers. Even with the trust of villagers, the fear that they were supporting VC 
infiltrated villages was a constant concern. Although CORDS and CAP had identical 
goals, they remained separate efforts until the end of the U.S. presence in Vietnam due to 
a lack of collaboration between the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army. The U.S. defeat in 
Vietnam overshadowed some bright spots of the campaign. While partisans of CORDS 
and CAP claimed success in Vietnam, even they were forced to admit that it was too 
little, too late, with inadequate funding and participation.  Others, like Harry Summers, a 
Vietnam conflict expert, saw these SSTR efforts as a distraction from the main forces, 
which was the Viet Cong!26  
Defeat in Vietnam soured many soldiers, government officials, and defense 
experts on counter-insurgency, which was seen as an approach too slow, too indecisive, 
and incapable of producing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) required to secure public 
support for a war over the long haul. After a demoralizing decade of the 1970s, the 
United States military became fixated on what was eventually categorized as the 
“Revolution in Military Affairs,” a search for a high technology military machine capable 
of overwhelming opponents with “shock and awe,” or deter them from even thinking 
about going to war with America. Quick, decisive victory, it was hoped, would take 
public opinion out of strategy calculation. The high priests of RMA were half right—they 
did create a force capable of achieving rapid success and proved its lethality in the 1989 
invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, but failed to adequately consider post-conflict 
SSTR operations.  
 
26 Harry G. Summers, A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 
175-177.  
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3.  Military Support Groups 
Following Vietnam, the United States again tried its hand in stability and 
reconstruction operations in Panama, but on a much smaller scale than that of Vietnam 
and Iraq. During Operation Just Cause, the overwhelming, superiority of the U.S. military 
swiftly defeated Manuel Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), which created a 
power vacuum leaving Colón and Panama City virtually lawless. Following the combat 
arm of Operation Just Cause, the stability and reconstruction phase, Operation Promote 
Liberty was initiated. Since little thought was given to stability and reconstruction 
operations following the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. military, like so many times in 
its history, improvised an organization in order to fill the void of lackluster post-conflict 
planning. To accomplish this, Military Support Groups (MSG) were created. MSGs were 
used, primarily because NGOs were not included in the combat and post hostilities 
planning and therefore were neither ready, nor prepared to deploy humanitarian services 
to the battered areas of Panama.  
 Prior to the end of hostilities in Panama, there was not a clearly defined command 
structure for stability and reconstruction operations. This issue was not solved until the 
official end of hostilities. After Operation Just Cause ended, “the MSG was then placed 
under Joint Task Force Panama headed by Major General Cisneros.”27 Being placed 
under the JTFP gave the MSG a definitive command structure (See Figure 1). Jim Steele 
was selected to command the MSG because he spoke fluent Spanish, had extensive Latin 
America and civil military experience, and for his reputation for success.28 
 Under Colonel Steele, the MSG staff contained approximately 40 personnel, and 
the actual MSG groups varied in size depending on the mission they were to conduct.29 
During Promote Liberty, Colonel Steele’s stability and reconstruction efforts 
commenced; however, his task was made extremely difficult because there was no 
 
27 William Conley, “Operations ‘Just Cause’ and ‘Promote Liberty’: The Implications of Military 
Operations Other Than War” (Master’s thesis, Command and Staff College, 2001), 25. 
28 Richard H. Schultz, In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building 




                                                
political advisor or ambassador on scene.30 The lack of political authority led to long 
wait times for decisions to be made during stability and reconstruction operations. This 
issue was remedied when Ambassador Dean Hinton arrived in Panama, which allowed 
Colonel Steele to attribute more time to stability and reconstruction ope








JTF – PM 
MG Cisneros
 
Figure 1. MSG Command Structure.31 
A U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division was used extensively to assist the population 
in the reconstruction effort. CA teams “employed engineers and medical personnel to 
support infrastructure reconstruction and nation building projects.”32 These teams were 
instrumental in the reconstruction process, since there was minimal interagency 
coordination.  
The 101st Airborne and Military Police were forced to take over law enforcement 
and peacekeeping actions due to the collapse of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) 
and because the State Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP) officials were not able to take over training and support for 
the newly formed Panamanian National Police (PNP) Force. The MSG used military 
reservists who were police officers in the United States to aid in training the PNP.  
Overall, there were about 300 MP’s training and escorting the PNP on patrols throughout 
 
30 Anthony Gray and Maxwell Manwaring, “Panama: Operation Just Cause,” in Policing the New 
World Disorder: Peace Operation and Public Security, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedic, and Eliot 
M. Goldberg (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 7.  
31 Conley, “Operations ‘Just Cause,’” 25. 
32 Schultz, In the Aftermath of War, 35.  
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the city.33 In addition to MP’s and CA teams working under the MSG to help the 
population, the MSG also employed the 4th Psychological Operations Group. 
  The job of the 4th Psychological Operations Group was to “conduct positive 
PSYOPS missions; enhance the prestige of the Government of Panama (GOP) among the 
Panamanian people; assist in turning the police into a motivated, effective, professional 
force, respectful of human rights, dedicated to law and order, and subordinated to civilian 
democratic control; and boost popular support for the police.”34 
The work of MSGs in Panama was considered successful due in part to the close 
relationships the military created with the Panamanian Government and the citizens.  
Much like the CAP program in Vietnam, members of the MSG built close ties with the 
Panamanian citizens and with the government, which allowed for an effective and swift 
removal of radical elements of the PDF and restoration of services to the people of 
Panama. Panama should have been a warning for future SSTR operations conducted by 
the United States.  Operation Desert Storm was a swift, decisive victory for the U.S.-led 
coalition, which resulted in limited SSTR operations and even less planning. It was this 
mindset by the military planners that contributed to the fact that little or no post conflict 
planning occurred before the invasion of Iraq. Operation Promote Liberty was the last 
significant effort attempted by the United States to provide teams, whose sole use and 
mission was to conduct stability and reconstruction operations until the creation of PRTs 
following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.  
4.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghanistan) 
In 2001, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were officially established in 
Afghanistan by the United States. Their mission was to provide training and assistance to 
the local government, allowing them to participate in their government. Initially, PRTs in 
Afghanistan were successful in accomplishing their mission. Their success could be 
attributed to the lack of an active insurgency like that found in Iraq. Nonetheless, they 
were exported to Iraq in 2005.  
 
33 Schultz, In the Aftermath of War, 38. 
34 Ibid., 39. 
 17
5.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Iraq) 
Once again, in 2003, the U.S. military used overwhelming force to dispose 
Saddam Hussein and his corrupt, murderous regime. Unfortunately, the fall of Saddam 
was followed by mismanagement, chaos, and insurgency. The United States was forced 
to reach back across the chasm of the post-Vietnam decades to resurrect an earlier 
experiment.  In 2003, a program similar to CORDS was created by the United States 
called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Initially, PRTs were employed in 
Afghanistan, and, because of their success there, they were exported to Iraq in late 2005. 
In Iraq, the PRTs initially faced a myriad of challenges, from security to participation and 
funding. Given the relative success of PRTs in Afghanistan and the lessons learned from 
pacification efforts in Vietnam, one wonders why it took so long for PRTs to be 
established in Iraq. 
C.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
While PRTs in Iraq face many of the same issues as the DSP in Colombia, the 
two approach their problems differently. This is to be expected: Colombia has an internal 
conflict on its own soil, while the United States is attempting to bring order to a society 
far different in language and culture than its own. The different approaches also reflect 
national experiences, values, and resources. The nature of the enemy is different, which 
also determines the adaptation. Colombia’s weak democratic system has historically had 
its hands full dealing with the strength and freedom of movement of terrorist and 
paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) and the now demobilized United Self-Defense Groups 
of Columbia (AUC), all of which employ violence, kidnapping, and assassinations in 
order to gain political power and weaken democratic institutions of the state. The violent 
attacks and/or intimidation carried out by these groups against the civilian population and 
the country’s inability to protect its citizens has prevented many civilians from 
participating in the political process, or even to achieve a modicum of prosperity outside 
of criminal systems.    
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The FARC, ELN, AUC, and it lineal descendents known as Bacrimes (Bandes 
Criminales Emergentes), have enjoyed relative immunity from their crimes because of a 
confused and poorly organized demobilization process, a dysfunctional judicial system, 
and the Justice and Peace Law, which allowed for the minimal punishment of former 
AUC members who confessed their crimes. One of the goals of the DSP is to establish a 
fully functional Anglo-Saxon-style adversarial judicial system. The government is 
walking a thin line while trying to regain control of its country, defeat and demobilize 
terrorists groups without undermining the human rights of its citizens.  
PRTs in Iraq, similar to that of Colombia’s acción civica approach, are facing a 
strong insurgency that has prevented the establishment of democratic institutions and 
prosperity in the economically battered country. Iraq’s dictatorship fell quickly during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), but there was insufficient planning to establish a 
government that was able to provide services to the people of Iraq, beginning with 
security. Additionally, no one anticipated or planned to counter the insurgency that 
emerged even before combat operations had “officially” ceased on May 3, 2003. PRTs 
were behind the power curve from the beginning in Iraq because they were not 
established until two years after hostilities commenced, and when they had arrived in 
country, Iraq had become too dangerous for them to operate effectively. Much like 
Colombia, the Iraqi judicial system was inoperable and the insurgents were threatening 
the population because U.S. forces were unable to provide adequate protection. The 
military also provided security for PRTs, which limited their effectiveness until a solid 
security curtain was established following the surge of 2006-2007.  
The struggle for democracy and stability in Colombia and Iraq will continue to be 
problematic. The resilience of insurgent and terrorists groups within each country poses a 
significant threat to the overall effectiveness of each program and to the mission being 
conducted in each.  The insurgent groups in Colombia, especially the FARC, though 
reduced in strength, threaten government control in many areas of the country.  
In Iraq, U.S. forces worked diligently to secure the country in order for SSTR 
operations to occur. The significant economic and social turmoil that followed in the 
wake of OIF left PRTs at a disadvantage. As the setbacks, as well as achievements, 
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mounted in each campaign, each has responded differently to ever-changing situations. 
Ultimately, however, DSP and PRTs have a core mission to become an effective 
instrument of stability in these countries. The way each of these programs responds to 
continued adversity will determine just how effective each has become within its 
respective environment.  
 20
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III.  DEMOCRATIC SECURITY POLICY 
 The focus of this chapter describes the development and implementation of the 
Democratic Security Policy in Colombia. The DSP has been successful in reclaiming 
much territory for the government. Nevertheless, other criminal groups remain active and 
well funded, principally through their participation in the illicit drug trade. In addition, 
certain programs under the DSP, such as Justice and Peace Law, stand accused of 
sacrificing justice and human rights in the name of security. Over the past six decades, 
Colombia has been engulfed by insurgents, and since the 1980s, paramilitary violence. 
The DSP appears to be the first effort that has made progress in regaining control of 
Colombian territory and its population.  
A. INTERNAL CONFLICT 
 The DSP is a concept developed by President Uribe to restore the rule of law and 
peace throughout Colombia while trying to demobilize insurgent and paramilitary groups, 
reassert government control, and protect the population. Many citizens of Colombia have 
given up on the hope for a peaceful Colombia due to decades of internal conflict.  
B.  SECURITY 
 Colombia possesses a multifaceted, resilient insurgency that has wreaked havoc, 
especially since the 1980s. The inability of the Colombian government to control much of 
its territory and protect the population resulted in insurgent and/or paramilitary control of 
significant areas of Colombia. Under the DSP, President Uribe increased the number of 
military and police forces in an attempt to re-establish territorial control to protect and 
regain the support of the population, many of whom have lived under the rule of the 
FARC, ELN, or AUC for several generations. The increase in the numbers and 
proficiency of Colombian security forces has allowed for a three-pronged strategy: the 
first has been the creation of a network of “collaborators and informants who are paid to 
provide information about the insurgents.”35 Secondly, he created a “semi-trained 
 
35 International Crisis Group, “Colombia; President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, Executive 
Summary and Recommendations,” Latin America Report (13 November 2003), 1.  
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and 
displace the population.  
hese groups have been declared 
terrorists by the United States and the European Union.39 
a. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 
      
peasant militia force whose members operate in their own home communities.”36 These 
groups are known as “soldatos de mi pueblo,” or Home Guard. Lastly, an executive 
decree that was passed “grants the military a range of police powers with neither judicial 
approval nor oversight.”37 These methods to enhance security within the country have 
come under fire for limiting the human rights of the Colombian citizens by giving the 
military far too much power over them in combat zones. On the other hand, a 
humanitarian crisis has occurred in areas where illegal armed groups intimidate 
1. Insurgent and Paramilitary Issues 
 “Colombia is a classic case of guerilla organizations that are able to capture 
enough resources to support the growth of their military forces,” write RAND specialists 
in counter-terrorism Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa.38 Weak government presence in 
many areas of the country allowed many guerilla forces to consolidate. The FARC, which 
emerged in the 1960s, is a quasi-Marxist organization. In one form or another, the 
government has been responsible for the creation of these groups. The AUC coalesced in 
the 1990s as a confederacy of local paramilitary or “self-defense” organizations allegedly 
to counter the surge of Marxist insurgencies. All three of t
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, better known as the 
FARC, is a heavily armed group of guerillas that uses the illegal drug trade, kidnappings, 
and other illegal activities to finance their political and military agenda.  “The FARC is 
potentially the world’s richest and best funded insurgent group with a yearly income of 
                                           
36 International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 1. 
n Groups,” Veritas: 
Jour 05-2, vol. 2, no. 4 (2006) 50. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Chalk and Rabasa, Colombia Labyrinth, 32.  
39 Troy J. Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency: Colombia’s Main Oppositio
nal of Army Special Operations History, PB 31-
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 did 
not have to the capability to track them in the treacherous terrain in which they hid.  
more than one billion U.S. dollars,” writes Army historian Troy Saquety.40 Although the 
FARC is the most powerful insurgent group in Colombia, its popular support is minimal, 
due largely to its ruthless use of violence and intimidation.41 Even with little support, the 
FARC maintains strongholds in areas in the north and south of the country, as shown in 
Figure 2. Until 2005, the government had not successfully countered the FARC and
 
Figure 2. FARC Zones of Influence.42 
b.  Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 
The Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, better known as the ELN, is a 
Marxist-inspired group that formed in the mid-1960s inspired and initially funded by 
Castro.43 The group is the second-largest left-wing insurgency in Colombia, after the 
                                                 
40 Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 47.  
41 Chalk and Rabasa, Colombia Labyrinth, 29. 
42 Spiegel Online International Services, Spiegel Interview with Ingrid Betancourt’s Son, “My Mother 
is Fading,” December 10 2007. Spiegel Online International Services, 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,522443,00.html. 
43 Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 49.  
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 have occasionally been known to cooperate with the FARC against 
government forces and the AUC, they also compete with the FARC for the control of 
resources. 
ization have refused to disarm 
while others have simply transformed themselves into mafias known as bacrimes that 
now even cooperate with gueri
of insurgent and paramilitary held territory. To further complicate COIN operations, 
                                                
FARC, but historically does not rely so heavily on the illicit drug trade for funding, rather 
preferring extortion, kidnapping, and paid ransoms. They have typically operated in the 
areas close to oil pipelines and oil wells in the east along the border with Venezuela.44 
While they
c.  Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 
  The paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC, was 
officially created in 1997 out of various groups that had emerged spontaneously since the 
1980s. “The AUC’s stated purpose is to provide regional protection from Marxists 
insurgents.”45 The formation of the AUC came about allegedly in response to the violent 
actions committed by the FARC, although many of its members were simply gangsters. 
Under the DSP, the government has been able to demobilize the AUC, reclaim a large 
portion of its territory, and provide a blanket of protection in areas that have not seen a 
government presence in years. For this reason, “the AUC declared that the government 
was putting enough pressure on the FARC and ELN that its presence was no longer 
needed.”46 Due to the massive government undertaking, the AUC laid down it arms and 
disbanded between 2003 and 2006. Officially, the AUC has claimed to disarm and 
demobilize, but some radical elements within the organ
llas to shift illegal drugs.  
2. Counter Insurgency Operations 
 There has been an active Counter Insurgency (COIN) operation in some form or 
fashion since the 1960s. COIN operations in Colombia have been, up until the 
development of the DSP, weak and ineffective as the government tries to regain control 
 
44 Sacquety, “Forty Years of Insurgency,” 49.   
50. 45 Ibid., 
46 Ibid. 
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ontrol of Colombia and have the 
assets to combat the insurgent and paramilitary forces.  
operations to demonstrate the capacity of the government to 
rtified police stations in case of guerilla counterattack and to actively establish their 
                                                
Colombia is a huge and largely roadless country.47 The United States’ assistance in 
bolstering Colombia’s helicopter fleet has increased air mobility that has allowed the 
Colombian military and police to target once inaccessible guerilla strongholds. President 
Uribe has placed emphasis on properly funding government forces, to include the 
Colombian National Police (CNP), in order to regain c
a. Plan Patriota  
  Plan Patriota is the Colombian counterpart of Plan Colombia, a phased 
plan created under the DSP that would protect the population, reclaim territory, and 
combat insurgents. According to James Brittain, “U.S. and Colombian militaries moved 
away from the façade of a war on drugs and directly into a counterterrorism campaign 
called Plan Patriota.”48 Under Plan Patriota, insurgent-held territory was divided into a 
grid system. The system was used to develop intelligence of FARC activities and 
movements. This has permitted the government and military to chose what kind of unit 
would be used to combat the different elements of the FARC. The first phase of Plan 
Patriota would have the Colombian Special Forces attack certain FARC-controlled areas 
and secure them. “As part of this operation, the Colombian units conduct extensive civic 
action and psychological 
look after the people.”49  
 The second phase of this operation calls for the CNP to fill the gap left by the 
FARC and provide law and order in the reclaimed area. To accomplish this, “they build 
fo
 
presence.”50 The CNP units are basically there to provide a government presence for the 
population in order for them to feel more secure with the removal of the FARC and to 
 
47Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 62. 
48 James J. Brittain, “The Objective Reality of Plan Patriota: A Response to Subjective Propaganda,” 
Colombia Journal (January 24 2005): 1.  
49 Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 64. 
50 Ibid. 
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s with the 
e population. The protection of the 
population is seen as an essential task under the DSP. 
ldatos de mi pueblo, previously known as the Sodatos campesinos or 
peasant
 ow stationed in small, newly-built military bases in the 
                                                
provide protection from FARC retaliation. This is an extremely important element in this 
operation. This is the first significant interaction of government force
population in many areas where trust in the government must be created.  
 The third phase is implemented only after the area has been secure. At this point, 
“additional assets, primarily public services, are added in order to consolidate the 
government control of the area.”51 This plan is used to reclaim territory and , arguably 
the most important part of this operation, to protect th
b. Protecting the Population 
  There are many efforts used by the Uribe administration to fight the 
insurgent and paramilitary organizations while protecting the population. One of these 
efforts was the so
 soldiers. 
Originally, the peasant soldiers were meant to serve as municipal guards 
during the day and go home at night. But after they were declared military 
targets by the FARC and ELN and following a number of attacks on them, 
most are n
villages.52 
The soldatos de mi pueblo is a program where conscripts are allowed to serve in their 
own village or town. This has increased the protection of the people because the members 
of the soldatos de mi pueblo are familiar with the members of their community, so it is 
more difficult for the insurgents and paramilitary groups to operate within these areas. In 
2003, there were approximately 15,228 soldatos de mi pueblo.53 The use of the soldatos 
de mi pueblo combined with additional police “has permitted most mayors to return to 
their municipalities, after having been under threat of the FARC since mid-2002.”54 This 
 
51  Jones, “Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota,” 64.  
52 International Crisis Group, “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” Latin 
America Report (13 November 2003), 4.  
53 International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 4. 
54 International Crisis Group, “Colombia,” 8. 
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Force,”
PSDF potentially one of the 
,098 municipalities in 
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hase a total of 60 Blackhawk and Huey helicopters, 
                                                
vel approach to counter-insurgency—a militia known as “People’s Self De
 was used in Vietnam under the umbrella of CORDS.  
Many American officials considered the 
GVNs [Government of Vietnam] most promising pacification devices, 
more for its mass involvement of people in supporting the government 
than for its still unproven military value.55 
The close-knit community in which the Vietnamese lived allowed them to identify 
communist forces, and now as a member of the PSDF, to take action against these forces.  
 The use of the soldatos de mi pueblo was not the only effort made to curb 
violence and protect the Colombian population. By 2005, under Uribe the Colombian 
military had increased from 158,000 to 207,000 active duty personnel, while the CNP 
ballooned from 97,000 to 121,000 members.56 The increase in the number and power of 
the police forces is significant because this is the first time in the country’s history that 
the CNP has been able to provide a police presence in all 1
C bia.57 With the increased presence, there has been a decrease in violence 
countrywide and far fewer attacks on the country’s infrastructure. 
 Furthermore, there has been a significant reorganization of the military in order to 
make it more mobile and able to combat the FARC, in the mountainous FARC-controlled 
territory. Realizing the restraints on the Colombian military, the government reached an 
agreement with the U.S. Army to purc
which has allowed for the formation of the mobile brigade and the replacement of many 
conscripts with professional soldiers. 
 The Colombian military and CNP have taken an approach much like that of the 
U.S. Marine-based, Vietnam era, Combined Action Program (CAP). In this program, a 
small number of U.S. Marines would live alongside the natives in their villages in 
Vietnam in order to protect the villagers and to build their trust and confidence in U.S. 
forces. Basically, the villagers and Marines cooperated in defense of the village and its 
 
55 Cosmas and Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 131.  
56 Garry Leech, “The Successes and Failures of President Uribe,” Colombia Journal (28 November 
2005), 2. 
57 Ibid., 2.  
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a but still receive fierce resistance from the FARC in many 
location , espe y t rategic corridors” along which the FARC moves 
arms, troops, and hdrugs.  
                                                
people. One example of this is in village of La Unión Peneya. La Unión Peneya was a 
village that was all but destroyed in 2002, when the Colombian military and elements of 
the FARC battled throughout the village.58 Due to the intense fighting, the villagers were 
displaced and re-established themselves elsewhere. For more than three years, the village 
lay in ruin but protected by government forces. It was not until January 2007 that the 
villagers began to make their way home with government encouragement.59 The military 
remained in the town to protect the returning refugees. They did this to show the villagers 
that they could depend on the government to protect them from the FARC.  Fortunately 
for the villagers, the government forces protecting the village have been able to thwart 
three attempted attacks on the village.60  With protection provided by the military, the 
governor of La Unión Peneya has been able to return to the village, providing the village 
a legitimate form of government apart from the FARC. Operations like this are being 
conducted across Colombi
s ciall hose located in “st
 3.  Judicial System 
  The judicial system in Colombia has been plagued by corruption, 
inefficiency, and violence toward elected officials. One of the goals of the DSP is to 
create a fully functional judicial system—a lofty goal, considering the amount of 
corruption that existed and still exists. Due to the past five decades of violence, the 
government and judicial system have suffered many assassinations and kidnappings that 
have damaged the judicial system and intimidated judges and lawyers. To further 
complicate matters, guerilla forces such as the FARC and ELN,  were able to infiltrate 
local and regional government offices and judicial systems throughout the country. The 
violence against members of the judicial system has increased to an extent that the United 
States has stepped in and assisted the Colombian Department of Interior in training and 
 
58 LTC Patrick J. Christian, “Building Capacity – Interagency & Intergovernmental CCAI Teams in 
Southern Colombia,” U.S. Army Special Forces, US MLGRP-Colombia PATT Station-Florencia (6th 
Division, COLAR), 2. 
59 Ibid., 3. 
60 Ibid., 5.  
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and tra  State 
Depart  
ts, and members of the left wing Patriotic Union Party. In 
2002, it was expanded to include mayors, city council members and 
ned and well-funded organization 





inability of Colombian institutions to assert authority throughout the 
                                                
protecting them. According to the U.S. State Department, “We have launched a program 
to protect threatened members of the judiciary in Colombia through temporary relocation 
ining in a third country.”61 Colombia’s Justice Department and the U.S.
ment are working together to protect many offices and officials in Colombia.  
Working with the Colombian Ministry of Interior, the U.S. has provided 
protection assistance to 2,068 people and 36 offices under threat. The 
protection program includes threatened human rights workers, union 
leaders, journalis
municipal human rights workers after the FARC started to systematically 
threaten them.62 
The FARC has been able to reach almost everyone in Colombia, and even the highest 
officials are not exempt from the threats of kidnapping, murder, and violence. If the 
government is not able to protect its elected officials and members of its judicial system, 
one wonders how it will be able to defeat a highly trai
ent control of territory in Colombia. 
4. Human Rights 
 Human Rights has been an issue in Colombia since the initial skirm
n the government forces and insurgents almost six decades ago.  
Unlike other regions of the hemisphere, where the rights of the citizen 
were eroded by the excessive use of power on the part of the State, the 
rights of Colombian citizens have been threatened mainly by th
country and to provide citizens with continuous and reliable protection 
against the threat and arbitrary action of illegal armed groups.63 
The combat actions taken by the military against insurgent forces combined with ruthless 
and violent takeover of many villages by insurgent groups have forced many Colombians 
 
61 U.S. State Department. 2002 - 2003 Report on Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. 
Record. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Available at: www.state.gov. 
62 Ibid., 1. 
63 Presidency of the Republic, “Democratic Security and Defence Policy,” Ministry of Defence. 
Republic of Colombia (2003), 14.  
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t decrease in the level of crime in Colombia.  “The number of kidnapping 
victims declined to 621 in 2006, as compared to 3,572 in the record setting year of 
to flee their villages and there has even been spillover into the bordering countries. The 
United Nations estimates that there are approximately two million displaced citizens, half 
of whom are under the age of 18.64 In 1996, the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees established an office in Bogotá and sub regional offices in 
Bucaramanga, Cali, and Medellin.65 These offices assist and advise the government on 
issues dealing with human rights. Under the DSP, the government has made extensive 
efforts to support and promote the human rights of their citizens and incorporating many 
suggestions from the United Nations. According to USAID, “between 2003 and 2004, the 
country’s human rights record improved significantly as the national homicide rate fell by 
12%, trade union murders were reduced by 37%, and kidnappings fell by 42%.”66  While 
impressive, the United Nations still contends “that the intertwined dynamics of the 
internal armed conflict, drug-trafficking, and organized crime continue to weigh heavily 
on the human rights situation.”67 Even with the UN assessment, statistics show a 
significan
2000.”68 
C.  DEMOBILIZATION 
 The process of demobilization in Colombia is currently an area of contention for 
many, but few question its success. Between 2002 and the official end of demobilization 
in August 2006, approximately 32,000 paramilitary members demobilized and 
                                                 
64 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, “Education for displaced 
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ces, many of these former paramilitaries continue 
to engage in criminal activities. A third problem is that demobilization was purchased at 
the price of justice and hum
demobilized from falling back into the hands of the groups from which 
they just left  h e victims of these ruthless 
 some demobilized 
paramilitaries have led authorities to the sites of mass graves, many family members of 
victims  lon e fate of loved ones killed by the AUC. 
surrendered their weapons.69 The demobilization of 32,000 paramilitary members is 
extraordinary in itself. But the problems occur because many of these “demobilizations” 
were a sham, in which local paramilitary groups paid local youths to “demobilize.” A 
second problem is that, without resour
an rights.  
1. Justice and Peace Law 
 The Justice and Peace Law of 2005 was created to assist in the demobilization and 
start the process of reconciliation.  According to Felipe Gomez Isa, a human-rights 
expert, “the law aims to strike a balance between peace and justice.”70 It provides 
incentives for paramilitaries to demobilize and to be reintegrated back into Colombian 
society. There is an ongoing debate concerning the effectiveness of the program in 
preventing the 
and ow well it provides justice for th
organizations. 
a.  Support for Justice and Peace Law 
  Those who support the Justice and Peace Law say that, without some sort 
of immunity, the AUC would never have demobilized. Opponents argue that the law lets 
paramilitary members off the hook practically scot-free for crimes they committed. 
Additionally, there is no process in place to take back the riches and land that were 
fraudulently or violently obtained. While some see the Justice and Peace Law as just 
another attempt for the government to negotiate with the terrorists organizations, some 
feel this process of reconciliation, combined with demobilization, is what Colombia 
needs to get past its six decades of internal violence. While
 still g to know th
                                                 
69 United States Office on Colombia, USOC, “Paramilitary Demobilization,” USOC, 
http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/Paramilitary%20Demobilization/.  
70 Felipe Gomez Isa, “Paramilitary Demobilisation in Colombia: Between Peace and Justice.” Human 
Rights Institute at the University of Deusto (April 2008), 2. 
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with the intention that this will produce 
positive ects for victims, as well as the establishment 
of guarantees of non-repetition of the atrocious crimes attributed to paramilitaries 
groups and their leaders.75 They insisted that it would “prevent their extradition to the 
2.  Incentives 
 Under the DSP, the Colombian government has made extensive efforts to 
reintegrate the former guerillas and paramilitaries by offering them numerous benefits 
such as educational, legal and psychological services, and health care.71 The reintegration 
process is a combined effort of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior. For 
demobilizing, former fighters are eligible to receive protection for themselves and their 
families via a safe house and a monthly stipend of 537,000 pesos (roughly $268).72 Upon 
completing the 24-month reintegration program, “each combatant will receive a proyecto 
productivo (productive project), a lump sum payment of 8,000,000 pesos (roughly 
$4,000) with which to start a small business or buy a house.”73 This program gives 
former paramilitaries the opportunity to start a new life with money provided from the 
government. In addition to monetary incentives, “it offers generous benefits in terms of 
sentencing to paramilitaries who demobilise 
 eff  for the rights to truth, reparation 
(including massacres, torture, abductions).”74 
3.  Effectiveness of Demobilization 
 The overall effectiveness of this program is debated because many argue that the 
Colombian government did not allocate sufficient resources to meet the needs of the 
demobilized paramilitaries. The demobilization of approximately 32,000 paramilitaries 
has been considered a success, but Human Rights Watch criticizes the process of 
demobilization because negotiations have provided numerous benefits to the paramilitary 
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 the process of demobilization, which appears to be 
successful when considering the numbers of demobilized paramilitaries, but provides no 
he victims.  
D.  ECONOMY 
militaries have taken their toll on Colombian 
resourc  these 
groups.
 is a fact that violence in Colombia has cost dearly, both in human terms 
s well as socially and economically. The economic impact of the conflict 
 significant: if Colombia had been in peace for the last 20 years, the per 
                                                
United States, minimize potential prison terms in Colombia, and allow them to retain as 
much of their illegally obtained wealth as possible.”76 In fact, at the time of writing, 
former paramilitary kingpin Miguel Angel Mejia-Munera, former leader of the AUC, was 
extradited to the United States for violations of the provisions of the Justice and Peace 
Law. By 2007, “92 percent of the 30,000 paramilitaries have benefited from a de facto 
amnesty declared by decree. Only 8% come under the Justices and Peace Act.”77 The 
current recommendation by many human rights groups is to allow the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the human rights violations.78 The government has 
not allowed this course of action to occur even though its judicial system is overworked, 
lacking sufficient resources and in many cases corrupt because they would not be able to 
control the actions of the ICC. Additionally, the U.S. would be limited in what actions it 
could take if the ICC were involved in Colombia. In any case, the Colombian government 
will not be able to accommodate the recommendations of everyone and has chosen to 
remain confident and steadfast in
justice to families of t
1.  Effects of the Democratic Security Policy on the Colombian 
Economy  
 The insurgents and para
es because the government is forced to spend precious resources to fight
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Under the DSP, President Uribe has placed economic development high on his list of 
priorities, just ind rogress was 
a.  The United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
, like Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, 
complain that union leaders continue to be assassinated in Colombia while officials look 




capita income of the average Colombian would be 50% higher today, and 
it is estimated that 2.5 million children would live above the poverty 
line.79  
 beh  security and demobilization. In 2006, significant p
made with the drawing up of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.  
  The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement “will eliminate 
tariffs and other barriers to goods and services, promote economic growth, and expand 
trade relations between the United States and Colombia.”80 This agreement, though 
approved by the Bush administration, still has not been ratified by Congress at the time of 
writing. Congress is concerned about the impact a free trade agreement with Colombia 
could do to “U.S. living standards.”81 Others
82 Ratification of the United States-Colombia Free
be a huge economic milestone for Colombia.  
b. Economic Assistance and Development  
  The United States-Colombia Free Trade agreement is not the only possible 
source of economic assistance. Between 2002-2006, the United States provided $4 billion 
                                                 
79 World Bank Website, “Colombia Country Brief: Developmental Progress,” World Bank Website, 
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324969~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:324946,00.html. 
.S. Free Trade Agreement,” Brookings 
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 boosted the economy, although the benefits 
ntinues to provide economic aid to Colombia even after the 
conclusion of Plan Colombia. During 2007-2008, the United States provided 
approximately $1.6 billion in economic aid with nearly 80% going to the Colombia 
military and police forces.85 
                                                
to Colombia under Plan Colombia.83  Not only has Colombia received economic 
assistance from nations around the world, the DSP has had a direct effect on the economy 
of Colombia by increasing security. This
have not been felt evenly across the social spectrum. The improved security situation has 
increased the “confidence in national and foreign investors,”84 pumping a great deal of 
investment into the Colombian economy.  
 The United States co
 
83 Gary Leech, “U.S. Willing to Deploy Combat Troops To Colombia,” Colombia Journal (May 
2006): 1.  
84 World Bank Web site, “Colombia Country Brief.”  
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or them.  
                                                
IV.  PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS 
The United States has conducted numerous SSTR operations such as the 
American South following the Civil War, in Latin America and the Caribbean after 1900, 
Japan and Germany following World War II, in Vietnam, in Panama in Operations Just 
Cause, and now in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The establishment of the Department of 
Defense Directive 3000.05 made stability operations a core mission of the Department of 
Defense instead of a secondary mission.86 In the past, stability operations were not 
considered a primary mission of the U.S. military, but mostly an ad hoc organization that 
was created long after combat operations had ceased, but this changed with 3000.05.  
In 2005, “Cable 4045 issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and Multi National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I), established PRTs.”87 Since their establishment, PRTs have 
struggled to live up to the high expectations set forth f
The PRT program was established in 2005 to assist Iraq’s provincial 
governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to 
govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political 
and economical development and to provide  the provincial administration 
necessary to meet the basic population needs.88  
An extremely dangerous security environment limited the initial success of the 
PRT. As the security environment continued to deteriorate from 2006 to 2007, the PRTs 
were limited to providing services in areas that were considered safe to operate. To 
counter this threat and still remain capable of assisting the Iraqi people, the United States 
created the ePRT or “embedded PRT” within a combat brigade. The ePRT was 
established and deployed as part of the 2007 U.S. troop surge.89 The ePRT and PRT have 
been essential in reestablishing governments at the provincial level and below.  
 
86 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. November 28, 2005.  
87 Paul J. Salmon, “The Role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stability Operations: Reality and 
Potential” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Masters Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2008), 3. 
88 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the 
United States Congress. SIGIR (January 2009), 186. 
89 Ibid. 
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 This shift from U.S. support points out the United States’ lack of planning 
concerning post-conflict stability and reconstruction, especially in an operation the size of 
Iraq. The timeliness of infrastructure repair and employment are only two of many issues 
that undermined Iraqi support for U.S. military and stability and reconstruction 
operations. If the United States had an existing PRT organization during the early phase 
of combat operations, it might not have encountered some of the reconstruction issues 
that it encountered such as improper funding, a lack of a clear chain of command, and 
being restricted to Forward Operating Bases due to the poor security environment. PRTs 
in Iraq were not incorporated into the stability and reconstruction phase of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom until 2005, which resulted in the uncoordinated activity of interagency 
organizations and military reconstruction efforts. Additionally, there were no PRTs that 
operated throughout the country to assist communities affected by combat operations 
outside one of the major operating hubs.  Once PRTs were introduced, they had an 
immediate impact in reconstruction efforts. In the beginning they primarily consisted of 
civilians, which hindered their ability to move around the country. The military began to 
provide security and transportation for PRTs throughout Iraq and 10 of the PRTs were 
“embedded within a military brigade,” known as ePRTs.90 Once they were incorporated 
with military units, ePRTs were able to provide assistance and support to the population 
that was located in areas where security concerns remained an issue. PRT support of the 
population combined with military security and transportation has helped Iraqis to make 
extensive progress, which was less evident when U.S. military forces alone were 
coordinating reconstruction efforts. 
 A.  COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 
 The command structure of the PRTs in Iraq have been a source of debate since 
their introduction in Iraq in late 2005. An April 2008 report commissioned by the House 
Armed Services Committee claims there still remains a significant lack of clear guidance 
for PRTs in Iraq. “Essentially, there are multiple chains of command: through the 
military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and Washington-based country 
 
90 U.S. Agency for International Development. “Iraq PRTs: Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” (Fall 
2007), 4.  
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representatives of the department agencies.”91 This convoluted and often confusing 
command structure poses a real concern for the DoD and DoS, whose personnel make up 
the majority of the PRTs. The counter-argument is that a solid command structure exists, 
but is simply misunderstood. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) claims PRTs fall under the “command of the Ambassador and the MNF-1 
Commanding General.”92 However, this ignores a significant portion of the actual 
members who possess some type of authority over PRTs in Iraq. Additionally, PRTs 
report to a task force, regional command, and then to the U.S. Central Command, where 
as the civilian counterparts of the PRT report directly to their respective agencies.93 
  The PRTs in Iraq are compromised of 50-100 civilian and military personnel 
depending on the area and/or mission, of various backgrounds and mission-specific 
talents, who work together to conduct effective stability and reconstruction operations in 
the provinces of Iraq (See Figure 3). Members from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
USAID, translators, and members of a U.S. Army civil affairs company are among those 
included in the makeup of the Iraqi PRTs.  
 The number and type of PRTs operating in Iraq have fluctuated since their 
introduction in 2005.  
As of August 2008, three types of U.S.-led PRTs were operating in Iraq: 
11 PRTs at the provincial level of government; 13 ePRTs embedded with 
U.S. brigade combat teams and operating in local governments in 
Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Diyala provinces; and 4 Provincial Support 
Teams (PST), which are smaller PRTs that cannot be based in the intended 
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USG/Contractor Civilian:    13-15 
LES Professional Staff:   22-32 
BBA DoD Civilians:     0-6 
Military PRT Members:         23 
Total:     58-87 
Figure 3. PRT Command Structure and Composition.95 
Combined with a combat brigade, ePRTs were able to conduct SSTR operations in areas 
that are considered insecure. The location of PRTs and ePRTs can be seen in Figure 4.  
B.  SECURITY 
 PRTs do not provide their own security and must be escorted by the U.S. military 
for security and transportation. According to the United States Institute of Peace, “the 
 
95 Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034. (Arlington April 30, 2008). 
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U.S. Embassy has ruled that movement security provided by coalition partners does not 
meet U.S. standards. Therefore, U.S. personnel generally are unable to leave their bases 
unless they can make special arrangements with nearby U.S. forces.”96 The lack of 
security and transportation has seriously hindered the effectiveness of the PRT prior to 
the surge in 2006. Following the surge, the security situation has improved and PRTs are 
now operating within an environment that is conducive for them to move more freely 
throughout the country and deliver the much needed money and assistance to the Iraqis.   
1. PRT Security  
The security for PRTs is normally called a Personal Security Detail (PSD), 
composed of both military and civilian contracted agencies depending on the location.  
Everything in Iraq is based on security. If the security situation deteriorates, PRTs and 
more specifically Foreign Service officers are not able to work with their Iraqi 
counterparts. In February 2007, the DoS and DoD signed a Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) where PRTs will receive U.S. military escorts when traveling throughout the 
Iraq.97 This has enhanced protection of PRTs while conducting reconstruction operations. 
“While security restrictions do limit the opportunities to engage with Iraqis and cause 
frustration for FS members who need to meet with Iraqis to do their jobs, none of the FS 




96 Robert M. Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.” United States 
Institute of Peace (Washington D.C.: March 2007), 8. 
97 Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” 50. 
98 Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map” Foreign Service Journal (March 2007): 31. 
 Figure 4. Location of PRTs and ePRTs.99 
PRTs are not willing to sacrifice their security and personal well-being to conduct 
reconstruction operations so they must make the most of the time they actually have in 
the field. The insurgency in Iraq has had a significant effect on reconstruction operations.  
2. Insurgency  
Stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq have been hampered by the 
insurgency. “The security situation places real limits on the ability of PRT personnel to 
promote economic development by counseling Iraqi officials, encouraging local leaders 
                                                 
99 Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team Program in Iraq. 
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and business owners, and motivating outside investors.”100 Security for the PRTs and 
effectiveness go hand in hand. For example, in 2006, the security situation in Basra was 
extremely dangerous, which resulted in a drawdown of PRT personnel there.101 “With 
their small complement of troops and limited armaments, PRTs were extremely 
vulnerable, if they are not co-located with Coalition combat units.”102 Additionally, there 
is a debate concerning who provides protection to the PRTs when they are in the field. 
“Interagency dispute over whether the U.S. military would provide protection, combined 
with a worsening security atmosphere in much of Iraq in 2005-06 led to many PRTs 
being virtually paralyzed.”103  
According to Steven Groves, an expert in the War on Terrorism, “the Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams spread across Iraq would likely cease operations if their military 
components were withdrawn.”104 Due to the insurgency, a heavy emphasis was placed on 
stability and security operations so reconstruction efforts could be conducted efficiently 
and in a timely manner. 
3. Protecting the Population 
 The DSP in Colombia has placed a significant emphasis on protecting the 
population, especially the rural population. The PRT does not have a means to protect the 
Iraqi population. They rely heavily on the U.S. military for their own protection and for 
the protection of the members of Iraqi civil society. Even though they do not possess a 
direct means to protect the Iraqi population, the mere presence of combat troops has been 
and continues to be used as an effective tool for combating Al Qaeda-based terrorism and 
warring religious factions.  This, however, is not in itself an antidote for defeating 
terrorism. In addition to U.S. troops conducting routine patrol, the Iraqi army has now 
 
100 Perito, “Special Report 185: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” 8. 
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been established and is taking over as the protector of the population. Unfortunately, 
corruption in the army and police force continue to be a problem. In 2003, the increase in 
violence made it difficult for the CPA to build and reintegrate Iraqi citizens back into the 
security force “because of poor planning, insufficient resources, and the failure to 
effectively counter the growing insurgency.”105   
C. TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS 
 The terrorists and insurgent organizations in Iraq have posed the most significant 
obstacle for PRTs operating in areas that are not secured by military forces or outside the 
Forward Operating Bases (FOB). Al Qaeda and Shi’a and Sunni religious factions pose 
the most significant threat to PRTs in Iraq. Al Qaeda attacks have increased violence 
between the Shi’a and Sunni in an attempt to destabilize the country have resulted in an 
unfavorable operational environment for PRTs to operate.  
1. Al Qaeda 
 Al Qaeda is a worldwide terrorist organization that uses extremist Islamic 
arguments to persuade its members that the United States in particular and the West in 
general, and Western values, like those of the United States, are inimitable to Islam. “(Al 
Qaeda) seeks to rid the Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the 
West and replace their governments with fundamentalists Islamic regimes,” according to 
Jashree Bajoria.106 Osama Bin Laden created Al Qaeda around 1988.107 Unlike the 
FARC, who use illicit drug trade to fund operations against the Colombian government, 
“Bin Laden, member of a billionaire family that owns the Bin Ladin Group construction 
empire, is said to have inherited tens of millions of dollars that he uses to help finance the 
group. Al-Qaeda also maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from 
like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable 
 
105 Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction 
Experience” (Arlington: February 2, 2009), 124. 
106 Jashree Bajoria,  “Al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-qaida, al-Qa’ida),” Backgrounder 9126 (April 2008), 1.  
107 Ibid., 1.  
 45
                                                
organizations.”108 Al Qaeda’s command appears to be located in the Pashtun areas of 
South-Eastern Afghanistan and Eastern Pakistan.  
2. Destabilization 
 The 2003 Coalition invasion destabilized Iraq by removing from power through 
de-Baathification the Sunni elite who had ruled Iraq since its creation in 1920. The 
Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Paul Bremer, dissolved the Iraqi military with 
CPA Order Number 2, 23 May 2003, based on the assumption that the Ministry of 
Interior and the Iraqi police would be able to establish and maintain security and 
throughout the country while the military was re-established with “Western concepts of 
accountability and rule of law.”109  The disestablishment of the military inadvertently 
ignited further violence by throwing a military force of approximately 375,000 
members110 on the street, minus approximately 40,000 who were retained to provide 
external defense. There were no programs developed to deal with the large number of 
demobilized military members, and no training or initiatives to maintain a living for their 
families and for themselves. The demobilization of approximately 310,000 Iraqi soldiers, 
without pay, was a gift to the insurgency.  
3.  Incentives  
 There are very few incentives for insurgents to demobilize in Iraq, since they are 
fighting under a so-called “jihad” against American forces. Many of the insurgents in Iraq 
are only there to conduct operations against American forces and originate from other 
countries. The only real incentive for insurgents to demobilize is to avoid death by 
American or reconstituted Iraqi forces. Demobilization therefore, is likely to be a slow 
process directly linked to the provisions of security and economic stability.  
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D.  ECONOMY  
1. Iraq’s Economy 
 Iraq possesses an oil-based economy that is capable of sustaining its needs as a 
country and to continue SSTR operations without the financial aid of the United States. 
The United States has pumped billions of dollars into the economy of Iraq since 2003. 
Initially, U.S. funding was needed to repair critical infrastructure and get the country 
back on its feet. Nearly seven years later, the U.S. is still pouring money into a country 
that as of 2008 possesses a projected surplus of $86 billion in oil revenue.111 Though this 
is not directly related to PRT funding, some of the money spent by PRTs in the 
reconstruction of Iraq has been and should continue to come from Iraqi funds.  
2.  Economic Aid From the United States  
 The United States has been the major source of funding for stability and 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. There are other coalition partners working in the region and 
providing economic assistance. However, many countries refused to assist in the 
reconstruction of Iraq due to the unilateral approach taken by the United States during the 
invasion of Iraq. Between the years of 2005-2008 the U.S. has expended approximately 
$32 billion in stability and reconstruction efforts.112 “International donors have pledged 
about $14.9 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction.”113 In addition to the enormous 
amount of funding provided directly to the reconstruction of Iraq, the U.S. also provided 
“$1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for troops from 20 countries 
other than the United States and Iraq.”114 
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a. PRT Funding 
  The United States has spent a significant amount of money on stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. PRTs possess a large number of funding sources to 
support projects to include: USAID, State Department, Commander Emergency 
Response Program Funding (CERP), and various other donors. Money provided from the 
PRTs is essential in keeping the civilian population employed and providing funds 
needed for reconstruction. Every aspect of stability and reconstruction depends on 
funding provided from PRTs. According to Cooling and Gropman, “men, material, and 
finances may be most important for stability and reconstruction operations.”115 
b.  Commanders Emergency Response Funding and Quick Reaction 
Funding 
  The bulk of the funding for PRTs is provided from the Commanders 
Emergency Response Fund largely because a streamlined process to receive funding 
makes it relatively red-tape free. Funding has proven to be a major issue for PRTs since 
their establishment in Iraq especially for PRT members from the Department of State. In 
order to alleviate this problem and release funding to its officers, the DoS created “Quick 
Reaction Funding.”116 The QRF provides funding for PRT projects that cost less than 
$25,000.117 “QRF funding for projects greater than $25,000 becomes mired in 
bureaucracy and often takes months for approval.”118 Even with the changes to the 
distribution of PRT funding, “uncertainty over future funding amounts limited their 
ability to commit to long-term reconstruction projects.”119 Funding will continue to be a 
source of concern for PRTs in future operations. 
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c.  NGO Coordination 
  In addition, to issues with funding and the insurgency, the lack of 
interagency coordination in Iraq has hamstrung some PRT guided reconstruction efforts 
Duplication of projects has resulted from the refusal of certain aid organizations to work 
with or even communicate with military forces, which has benefited neither. Due to the 
extensive damage inflicted on the Iraqi infrastructure and population, billions of U.S. 
dollars have been used in an effort to rebuild the country. Currently, the United States has 
allocated $830.2 billion to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.120 Only recently has Iraq begun 
to tap into its $86 billion oil surplus revenues to pay for infrastructure projects.121 If 
stability can be achieved, Iraq should have the resources to maintain its economy and 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 President Uribe’s DSP in Colombia has brought numerous benefits to a country that 
has been plagued by insurgent and paramilitary violence, lack of government control and 
weak democratic institutions. In 2002, when President Uribe took office, many believed 
that Colombia was perilously close to becoming a failed state.  
 The PRT was imported into Iraq from Afghanistan in 2005 in order “to assist Iraq’s 
provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to 
promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economical 
development and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic 
population needs.”122 
 The Colombians have evolved their methods during the struggle against insurgents 
and paramilitaries since the 1980s. The United States has had time to utilize lessons 
learned from numerous SSTR operations, but continues to falter from a lack of 
coordinated, in depth planning prior to combat operations or anticipated SSTR 
operations. When analyzing the DSP and PRT, both possess elements that would be 
beneficial if incorporated into the other. Even with this in mind, one must understand that 
the DSP and PRTs are operating in two completely different SSTR environments.  
 The most important factor that would have the largest impact on reconstruction 
efforts conducted by PRTs is identifying a clear chain of command. Many of the efforts 
to conduct reconstruction operations in Iraq were hampered by confusing and convoluted 
chains of command. Additionally, the U.S. should reach back in time to their pacification 
efforts in Vietnam and revive or institute a program similar to that of Combined Action 
Program (CAP). Colombia has utilized a similar program, the soldatos de mi pueblo in 
order to try and protect its population against insurgent violence. 
 The element of soldatos de mi pueblo, or Home Guard, is a technique used in 
Colombia wherein villagers are used as a type of militia that is empowered to protect the 
village from insurgent activity and provide intelligence concerning insurgent activity to 
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the CNP and the Colombian military. This program could be used in Iraq in order to 
provide protection to the villages, where the U.S. military cannot routinely operate.  The 
creation of the soldatos de mi pueblo in Iraq, like Colombia, would be a short-term 
approach to a long-term problem. Maintaining these groups could have a detrimental 
effect if they coalesce into one large, armed militia group like the AUC. However, this is 
a short-term effort that would provide additional security while stability and 
reconstruction operations were ongoing.  Another option that would be useful to the PRT 
is the Combined Action Program that was successfully used in Vietnam (CAP).   
 The CAP program placed small contingents of Marines in the villages and hamlets 
to provide protection and build trust with the Vietnamese. Currently the PRTs are mission 
restricted if the security situation deteriorates. The PRTs should move off the Forward 
Operating Bases and into villages and towns, where they can build trust with the villagers 
and have a firm grip on reality in their operational areas. It is difficult to build a 
relationship with the Iraqi people when PRTs disappear during deteriorating security 
situations. Living in the villages and towns would also allow the PRT to act as an element 
of security for the population as opposed to relying solely on the security and protection 
of the U.S. military. The risk of placing PRTs or elements of PRTs in villages and towns 
is the fear that the village might be infiltrated by insurgents and the U.S. could be 
unknowingly operating and cooperating with insurgents. The same fears were present in 
the CORDS program in Vietnam.  
 Operating in an environment that is being attacked by an active insurgency does not 
mean that reconstruction operations must cease. The creation of the ePRT is a step in the 
right direction for conducting SSTR operations in an insecure environment. The ePRT is 
a PRT that has been incorporated into a combat brigade, which allows the PRT to 
conduct stability and reconstruction operations in areas where security issues remain. 
Security is a major concern in stability and reconstruction operations. “The first element 
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 This holds true in most SSTR operations. Colombia is no exception. Until 
Colombia can effectively defeat the FARC, complete government control of Colombia 
will remain out of reach.  
 The controversial Justice and Peace Law in Colombia is supposed to allow 
paramilitary members to confess their atrocities in return for special treatment by the 
Colombian government. Many human rights groups argue that the law is too flexible and 
allows too many rewards for the ex-paramilitaries and too few for the victims’ families. 
The government should aggressively prosecute members who have committed atrocities 
in the past, and if their judicial system is unable to hear the case in a timely manner, they 
should be more proactive in extraditing high-profile criminals who might otherwise 
escape prosecution through paramilitary infiltration of the government.  
 The DSP and PRTs have made significant strides in trying to establish government 
rule, reclaim territory, protect the population, and promote economic development. The 
DSP has targeted the insurgent groups in Colombia, sometimes being accused of abusing 
human rights. Even with these accusations, according to USAID, “between 2003 and 
2004, the country’s human rights record improved significantly as the national homicide 
rate fell by 12%, trade union murders were reduced by 37%, and kidnappings fell by 
42%.”124 These results might be impressive, but they are just beginning in a long fight 
against the insurgents.  
 The most significant progress made by the PRTs is realizing the importance of 
security and the need for funding procedures. PRTs in Iraq were not able to conduct 
reconstruction operations in many instances due to the security environment. In future 
operations, the hope is that one will look back at the lessons learned during the PRTs’ 
time in Iraq and not make the same mistake. Secondly, the establishment of QRF by the 
DoS made the disbursement of funding to PRTs more efficient. This quick ability to 
receive finding led to the many successful reconstruction efforts.  
 There is no “correct” formula to conduct SSTR operations, but there are techniques 
and can be used that can significantly affect the people and environment in which the 
operation is being conducted. Planning, security, and funding can never be overlooked. It 
 
124 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Democracy and Governance in Colombia,” 1.  
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is the preparation made prior that will determine the success or failure in an SSTR 
environment. Overall the DSP has been more successful in SSTR operations and in 
combating insurgents, reclaiming territory, establishing government control, and 
protecting the population. Since the Colombians are operating as an internal entity, they 
fighting for the country in which they live, where the PRTs in Iraq are an external entity 
that will eventually leave, leaving all operations to the Iraqis. Additionally, de-
Baathification, combined with the newly acquired power of the Shi’a, is dividing the 
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